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THE ONE SENATOR, ONE VOTE CLAUSE
William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
Article I, section 3, clause 1 provides that the Senate "shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, * * * and each
Senator shall have one Vote." The requirement that each state
have two Senators was part of the "Great Compromise" reached
in Philadelphia, and may still be defensible today, to assure that
the Senate would be a deliberative body with relatively few
members and that the interests of the states qua states would be
represented. The requirement that each Senator have one vote
was also part of the Great Compromise but is much harder to
defend today. In my opinion, the "one Senator, one Vote" clause
is the most problematic one remaining in the Constitution.
The United States Senate flouts the constitutional principle
of "one person, one vote," in large part because of the "one Senator, One Vote" clause. Chief Justice Warren said as much in
Reynolds v. Sims,t where the Court held that state apportionments following the example of the Senate violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chief Justice
wrote:

* * * The right of a citizen to equal representation and to
have [his or her] vote weighted equally with those of all other
citizens in the election of members of one house of a bicameral state legislature would amount to little if States could effectively submerge the equal-population principle in the
apportionment of seats in the other house. * * * Deadlock
between the two bodies might result in compromise and concession on some issues. But in all too many cases the more
probable result would be frustration of the majority will
through minority veto in the house not apportioned on a population basis[.]
The one Senator, one Vote clause is problematic, both because it
is inconsistent with a bedrock constitutional value (majority rule)
and because its derogation from that value threatens energetic
government. The clause is more worrisome than other problem*
1.
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atic clauses, because there is little room for "interpretation" to
ameliorate its ill effects.
The one Senator, one Vote clause systematically skews national policy towards sagebrush values. The fourteen sagebrush
states2 have almost one-third of the votes in the U.S. Senate, but
less than one-tenth of the people in the country. Although the
sagebrush Senators are not completely homogeneous, they do
exhibit block voting characteristics and predictably affect closely
divided chamber votes. Three recent examples: if Senate votes
were weighted according to the states' representation in the
House (each Senator receiving half of the state's House allotment), the Senate would have voted 295-140 to override President Bush's veto of the 1990 civil rights bill, would have rejected
the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas for the Supreme
Court in 1991 (albeit in a close vote, 224-211), and would have
overwhelmingly (238-165) voted to remove the ban on entry into
the United States of people who are infected with the HIV virus
(a move that was defeated by 52-46 when proposed in 1993).
Consider each example in more detail.
The first example reveals the precise contours and some limitations of my objection. Even if the Senate had overridden President Bush's veto in 1990, it is doubtful that the House would
have done so. And, in any event, a civil rights bill was enacted in
1991. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Warren's point can still be
made: the one Senator, one Vote rule affects the point at which a
compromise will be crafted; the 1991 civil rights statute was a
diluted version of the 1990 bill.3 That the one Senator, one Vote
rule is so strongly anti-democratic is cause for concern, but that
concern might be ameliorated if it served a substantive value.
For example, the Framers required bicameral approval and presentment to the President to assure that hasty majorities would
not override individual liberties or unsettle the rule of law.4
Sagebrush values are often billed as libertarian (less government), but the sagebrush Senators' voting record is not distinctively libertarian or sensitive to rule of law values. As a group,
these Senators are libertarian when it comes to private rights to
government land (in the West) but not libertarian when it comes
2. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
3. For a key example, the 1990 bill explicitly overrode several Supreme Court decisions retroactively. The 1991 statute was silent on the issue, and the Supreme Court predictably construed the statute not to have retroactive effect. See Landgraf v. US/ Film
Products, 114 S. a. 1483 (1994).
4. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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to farm subsidies, defense spending, and the Alaska Pipeline
(where the sagebrush Senators were decisive in the Senate's insistence that pipeline decisions affecting the environment be unreviewable). Moreover, these Senators seem relatively less
sympathetic to the liberty of racial, ethnic, or sexual orientation
minorities. For instance, they consistently vote for gratuitously
anti-homosexual measures having no defensible policy rationale;
their vote against HIV-positive immigrants was anti-libertarian
and without any defensible medical justification.
The Thomas confirmation vote reflects not just the frequently decisive effect sagebrush overrepresentation has on issues,s but also the far-reaching importance of that effect. Unlike
the House, the Senate's consent is needed not only for the enactment of legislation, but also for the confirmation of federal
judges, agency heads, and department officials, as well as for ratification of treaties (by a two-thirds supermajority). As a result,
the sagebrush bloc not only has influence in Congress beyond
any democratic or normative justification, but also has similarly
indefensible influence on foreign policy, the composition of the
judiciary, and public administration.
The overrepresentation of small-population states ( especially the sagebrush states) in the Senate does not affect every
issue that comes before Congress; it probably has no decisive effect on most issues. When it does have a decisive effect, the phenomenon is anti-majoritarian but perhaps defensible according
to some other normative criterion. I am open to such justification, but the most obvious (libertarian) one is not supported by
the actual behavior of sagebrush Senators, either recently or
historically.6
Based upon my review of our post-New Deal constitutional
history, I am inclined to say that the one Senator, one Vote
clause is the most problematic in the Constitution: it is anti-dem5. Nineteen sagebrush Senators (16 Republicans, three Democrats) voted for
Judge Thomas, and only nine (all Democrats) voted against him. The overall Senate vote
was 52-48 in favor of Judge Thomas. The only other region to support Judge Thomas was
the South, including border states (19 Senators for, 15 Senators against). The Midwest,
East, and Pacific Coast Senators opposed Judge Thomas' confirmation (14 Senators for,
24 Senators against).
6. The sagebrush Senators have been a distinctive bloc throughout the post-New
Deal era. They have decisively influenced national policy through their alliance with
Southern Senators to sink strong civil rights laws and their strong support of McCarthyism in the 1950s, their Court-baiting and support for the nation's Indochina policy in the
1960s and 1970s, and their opposition to environmental, health, and safety regulation in
the 1970s and 1980s.
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ocratic, skews policy in hard-to-defend ways, and cannot be ameliorated by conventional interpretive or practical mechanisms.

